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COMMITMENT: THE TERM AND THE NOTIONS 
 
 
Philippe De Brabanter and Patrick Dendale 
Institut Jean Nicod & Université Paris 4-Sorbonne; University of Antwerp 
 
 
This volume brings together thoroughly reworked versions of a selection of 
papers presented at the conference The Notion of Commitment in Linguistics, 
held at the University of Antwerp in January 2007. It is the companion volume 
to a collection of essays in French to be published in Langue Française and 
devoted to La notion de prise en charge. Commitment is a close counterpart to 
prise en charge, and two contributors, Celle and Lansari, use it essentially as a 
translation of the French term. However, commitment and its verbal cognates (to 
commit NP to and to be committed to) do not cover the exact same range of 
meanings as prise en charge. For a thorough assessment of the French term, we 
refer readers to the introduction to the Langue Française volume. In the present 
article, we focus entirely on commitment. 
The term is widely used in at least three major areas of linguistic enquiry:1 
studies on illocutionary acts, studies on modality and evidentiality, and the 
formal modelling of dialogue/argumentation. In spite of its frequent use, the 
notion has rarely been theorised and has never been the subject of a monograph 
or a specialised reader. In keeping with this is the fact that none of the many 
dictionaries and encyclopaedias of linguistics or philosophy that we have 
consulted devotes a separate entry to it. 
Section 1 of this introduction briefly reviews what commitment means in the 
three fields just mentioned. Now and then, with respect to a particular issue, 
pointers are given to which articles in this collection have something to say 
about the issue. In section 2, we take a lexical and syntactic look at the ways in 
which the contributors to the present volume use the term. In section 3, we 
outline each of the contributions, with a focus on the role that commitment plays 
in them. 
1. Background 
1.1  Speech-act theory 
In speech-act theory, the term has been used, informally at least, since the very 
first days of the discipline. In his William James lectures of 1955, Austin talks 
of speech acts “committing [one] to certain future conduct” (Austin 1975: 89). 
In this context, the term is used first and foremost in connection with 
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‘commissives’ (acts of promising, pledging oneself, guaranteeing, swearing to 
do), and several theorists have no further use for it (e.g. Searle 1969: chapter 3; 
Leech 1983). In a way, this is unsurprising as (i) one of the core meanings of 
commitment is “promise”, (ii) promises are the core type of commissive speech 
acts, and (iii) early speech-act theorists tend to use the term in a non-technical 
sense. Note in this respect that dictionaries or encyclopaedias that have an entry 
for commissive usually define the notion in terms of commitment. Thus, 
Bussmann (1996: 83): commissive = “Speech act meant to commit a speaker to 
some course of action, […]” (a similar definition occurs in Crystal 1997: 71). In 
these sorts of uses, the locutions to commit NP to or to make a commitment to 
are barely more than synonyms of to undertake an obligation or to assume 
responsibility for. 
However, some early students of speech acts made use of the notion in their 
accounts of other acts too. Thus, Toulmin (1958) uses the verb to commit NP 
(to) in his characterisation not only of promises but also of predictions (1958: 
50ff) and, more generally, statements (1958: 76). Interestingly, Toulmin applies 
it to different ‘targets’: in most cases promises commit the speaker tout court (in 
all but one instance, the object of the commitment is left implicit), whereas 
statements about the future commit the speaker to – it seems – the very content 
(or consequences) of the act itself. Alternative formulations have the speaker 
committing herself by performing a certain speech act. 
One finds a similarly extended use of the verb to commit NP to in Austin’s 
lectures. Thus, assertions/statements (1975: 51-52, 139) and performatives 
(ibid.: 89) also commit their utterer to performing other acts. In Searle’s early 
work on speech acts, the term only comes up in connection with commissives, 
but in Expression and Meaning it is used in definitions of the illocutionary point 
(the core component) of both commissives and assertives. The point of an 
assertive is “to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something’s being 
the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition” (1979: 12). A similar use can 
be observed in Vanderveken (1990: 172, 182, 183). Some authors (Lyons 1977: 
734; Green 2007) assume that the performance of a speech act of any sort 
commits the speaker to certain beliefs and/or intentions (those stated in the 
‘sincerity conditions’ of each illocutionary act). [In this volume, Deschamps 
makes extensive reference to Lyons’s account of speech acts; Gunlogson and 
Poschmann suggest ways of making sense of speaker commitment in questions; 
Kissine discusses commitment in assertions; Morency, Oswald & Saussure assess 
speech-act-theoretic views on commitment.] 
But there is another sense of commitment in speech-act theory, a technical 
one, which was introduced in Searle and Vanderveken (1985): 
 
A theory of illocutionary logic of the sort we are describing is essentially a 
theory of illocutionary commitment as determined by illocutionary force. The 
single most important question it must answer is this: Given that a speaker in a 
certain context of utterance performs a successful illocutionary act of a certain 
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form, what other illocutions does the performance of that act commit him to?” 
(1985: 6) 
 
What is at stake is a different notion of commitment from the non-technical one 
identified so far. Searle & Vanderveken understand illocutionary commitment as 
a logical, semantic relation between illocutionary acts. The idea is that 
“sometimes by performing one illocutionary act a speaker can be committed to 
another illocution” (1985: 23), and this commitment is not a matter of the 
speaker’s preferences or mental states. Searle & Vanderveken further indicate 
that illocutionary commitment can be ‘strong’ or ‘weak’. This not being the 
place to provide formal definitions, we will be content with a few illustrations. 
All other things being equal, the speaker who says I beg you to do A is strongly 
committed to I ask you to do A, because every act of begging is an act of asking. 
And the person who utters the directive Open the door is strongly committed to 
the assertive The door is closed, because the latter is a presupposition of the 
directive. Speech act S1 strongly illocutionarily commits the speaker to S2 if in 
performing S1 she automatically also performs S2. As for weak illocutionary 
commitment, it concerns cases where the performance of S1 also satisfies the 
conditions on the performance of S2, even though S2 is not performed in the 
performance of S1. Thus a speaker who asserts Socrates is a man and All men 
are mortal is weakly illocutionarily committed to the assertion that Socrates is 
mortal. Much of Searle & Vanderveken (1985) and of Vanderveken (1990, 
1991) is devoted to commitment so understood. 
The previous discussion points to an additional feature of commitment in 
studies of speech acts that deserves our attention, gradability. It can be 
understood in different ways. Thus, Toulmin (1958: chapter 2) offers a detailed 
discussion of means of qualifying commitment by using modal expressions like 
probably (this shows there are ties between studies of speech acts and modality, 
see next section). So, commitment may be unreserved, but it may also be 
‘guarded’. A different, though related, way of approaching the gradability of 
commitment is via the meaning of illocutionary verbs. Vanderveken’s (1990: 
172) definitions of both suggest and guess involve a reference to a reduced 
commitment to the truth of a proposition. In a similar vein, Green (2007) writes 
that “conjecturing lays you bare to less demanding challenges than asserting”. 
These last two authors are actually referring to the way Searle & Vanderveken 
(1985) defined illocutionary forces: each force is defined in terms of the values 
of seven components. Two of these are framed in terms of strength: strength of 
the ‘illocutionary point’ (e.g. a command is stronger than a request), and 
strength of the ‘sincerity condition’ (e.g. “a speaker who supplicates expresses a 
stronger desire than a speaker who requests” (1985: 191)). Katriel & Dascal 
(1989) have criticised this position for confusing commitment with involvement. 
Commitment is absolute, all-or-nothing; involvement is graded. Therefore, they 
claim, what is at stake in the two ‘strength-components’ of the definition of 
illocutionary forces is involvement, not commitment. [Contributions that take a 
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stand on the gradability of commitment are Cornillie & Delbecque; Izutsu; Lansari. 
Contributions that appeal to a comparable, though not identical, notion of 
involvement are Cornillie & Delbecque; De Saeger] 
In this section, we have seen that, apart from its use in Searle & 
Vanderveken’s illocutionary logic, commitment is not a technical term. In its 
non-technical uses, the basic pattern is this: the performance of an illocutionary 
act commits the speaker to further acts. However, we have also seen that an 
assertion commits the speaker to the truth of the proposition expressed. One 
final observation: most scholars explicitly or implicitly take commitment to be a 
public attitude. Commitment publicly results from the performance of a speech 
act. This is especially clear in Green (2007) who takes the performance of a 
speech act to consist in the “overt manifestation of a commitment”.  
1.2  Modality 
In studies of modal expressions, the term commitment is often part and parcel of 
the definition of epistemic modality. For instance, Palmer puts forward the 
suggestion that 
 
the term ‘epistemic’ should apply not simply to modal systems that basically 
involve the notions of possibility and necessity, but to any modal system that 
indicates the degree of commitment by the speaker to what he says. (1986: 51) 
 
For similar characterisations, see e.g. Lyons (1977: 797), Bybee (1985: 166f); 
de Haan (1999), Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 52), and many others. 
Interestingly, Palmer means to include evidential markers within epistemic 
expressions, but this line is resisted by e.g. de Haan and Aikhenvald, who 
assume evidential markers to be neutral with respect to any epistemic 
commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed. In Aikhenvald’s 
conception, evidentiality is a “category in its own right” (2004: 7), designating a 
source of information (2004: 4). A linguistic expression is considered an 
“evidential proper” only if its core meaning is evidential (2004: 105). If its core 
meaning is something else (e.g. mood, modality, reported speech, etc.), but the 
marking of the information source also somehow comes in, Aikhenvald speaks 
of an “evidentiality strategy” or “evidential extension of a non-evidential 
category” (ibid.).2 On the other hand, a genuine evidential marker can have non-
evidential secondary meanings, like epistemic modality (2004: 6) or 
“commitment to the truth of the statement” (2004: 192), but the author stresses 
that this is not necessarily the case, even for markers of visual evidence: “the 
truth value of an utterance is not affected by an evidential” (2004: 4). 
Working within a truth-conditional framework, Papafragou (2006) argues 
against the view that epistemically used modals indicate the degree of speaker 
commitment to the propositional content. This she does inasmuch as this view 
goes hand in hand with the widely held assumption that epistemic modals make 
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no contribution of the truth-conditions of the utterances in which they occur (in 
other words, they are not part of the propositional content). Not only does she 
reject the general claim that epistemic modals do not contribute to truth-
conditions, but she also adduces evidence against the weaker claim that 
subjective epistemic modals do not contribute to truth-conditions. 
This last point alludes to the distinction between objective and subjective 
epistemic modality made by Lyons (1977: 797). Whereas the former modality 
concerns straightforward presentations of possibilities or necessities as matters 
of fact, the latter serves to qualify speaker commitment to the truth of her 
utterance (see also 1995: 331). Thus, in Lyons’s view, only objective, not 
subjective, epistemic modality is part of the proposition expressed. However, 
contends Papafragou, there is empirical evidence that even subjective epistemics 
play a propositional role. The question then is how to account for the strong 
intuition that subjective epistemics express the speaker’s degree of commitment 
to the proposition expressed (and therefore somehow appear to stand outside it). 
Papafragou claims that subjective epistemics are indexical: their semantics 
includes a parameter for the epistemic community on which the modal judgment 
is based. In extreme cases – Lyons’s subjective uses – this community is 
reduced to the speaker at the moment of utterance. This way, the indication of 
speaker commitment is now “taken to be an intuition not about truth conditions 
but about the type of epistemic agent providing the background assumptions for 
epistemic modality” (2006: 1700). 
Nuyts’s notion of ‘performativity’ is precisely designed to capture such a 
view of speaker commitment. Nuyts distinguishes between ‘performative’ and 
‘descriptive’ (uses of) modal expressions: 
 
A performative expression marks an attitude [an evaluation of a proposition] to 
which the speaker is fully committed at the moment of speech. In a descriptive 
use, the speaker is not committed, but is only reporting on an attitude regarding 
some state of affairs held by someone else, or by the speaker at some point in 
time other than the moment of speech, or as a hypothetical possibility. (2006: 
15) 
 
This distinction comes into its own in descriptions of epistemic modals. Nuyts 
suggests that epistemic verbs and adjectives can be used either way, but that 
epistemic adverbs and auxiliaries can only be used performatively, i.e. to 
express the speaker’s commitment. Interestingly too, the distinction can be 
applied to deontic modal expressions, but not to dynamic modality, all instances 
of which are descriptive, according to Nuyts. [In the previous discussion, 
commitment is a matter of who makes an evaluation, the speaker or someone else 
(i.e. who is its source). The contributions that deal with the notion of source are 
Celle; Cornillie & Delbecque; Deschamps; Gunlogson; Lansari, who speaks of 
‘origin’] 
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Faller (2006) appeals to Nuyts’s performativity (renamed ‘m-
performativity’, with m for mental) to show that certain tests designed to 
determine whether a given expression in a sentence affects truth-conditions in 
fact capture something totally different: whether the expression is used 
performatively or descriptively. Compare these examples: 
 
(1) ?If Max may be lonely, his wife will be worried. (from Papafragou 2006: 
1690) 
(2) If the gardener might be the thief, then we should watch her carefully. 
 
The near-unacceptability of examples like (1) has been taken to show that may 
is not truth-conditionally relevant, because all truth-conditional elements of a 
sentence should be embeddable under if. But might in (2) is embeddable, so 
what is the difference? Faller’s answer is that may in (1) is used performatively 
whereas might in (2) is descriptive. The intuition is that the speaker “may in fact 
be completely certain that the gardener is not the thief” (Faller 2006) and yet 
utter (2). This analysis is very close to Papafragou’s (2006: 1696). If correct, it 
shows that certain aspects of interpretation which were previously understood in 
terms of relevance/irrelevance to truth-conditions are in fact a matter of whether 
the speaker is committed to a modal judgment or not. 
There are other interesting connections between modality and commitment. 
We will only mention one more: as in studies of speech acts, commitment is 
widely understood by students of modality as a gradable notion. Different 
expressions mark different degrees of commitment, and several authors 
therefore speak of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ commitment (in a sense closer to 
Toulmin’s ‘guarded vs. unreserved’ than to Searle & Vanderveken’s ‘weak vs. 
strong’). Weak commitment would be expressed by may, perhaps, possible, etc.; 
strong commitment by must, certainly, necessary, etc. [Contributions that study 
modal markers of commitment are Celle; Cornillie & Delbecque; Pietrandrea] 
The notion that emerges from the study of modality does not overlap 
perfectly with the notion that emerges from speech-act theory. It is notable that 
the modal notion is seldom expressed by means of the verbal locution to commit 
NP to in the active voice. Rather than an action (and/or its result), commitment 
here is essentially a speaker’s attitude towards the truth of some propositional 
content. In this respect, it is close to the commitment that speech-act theorists 
associate with assertions. It is not surprising, therefore, that Lyons (1995: 254) 
should call the illocutionary commitment typical of assertions ‘epistemic’. 
Lyons actually pushes the analogy further. The sort of illocutionary commitment 
associated with directive acts he calls ‘deontic’, thus underlining the 
connections between the modal and the speech-act notions. 
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1.3  Formal models of dialogue/argumentation. 
Hamblin (1970) is the seminal publication that firmly established the concept of 
commitment in research concerned with the formal modelling of dialogue and 
argumentation. In his investigation of logical fallacies, Hamblin, an 
argumentation theorist and informal logician, pursues the goal of modelling the 
dynamics of dialogue: 
 
A speaker who is obliged to maintain consistency needs to keep a store of 
statements representing his previous commitments, and require of each new 
statement he makes that it may be added without inconsistency to this store. 
The store represents a kind of persona of beliefs: it need not correspond with 
his real beliefs, but it will operate, in general, approximately as if it did. We 
shall find that we need to make frequent reference to the existence, or 
possibility, of stores of this kind. We shall call them commitment-stores: they 
keep a running tally of a person's commitments. (1970: 257) 
 
First, note that Hamblin uses commitment as a count noun. A commitment is not 
an attitude or an action, but “a statement-token”, in Hamblin’s original 
formulation. Later developments of Hamblin’s work have tended to view 
commitments as propositions (i.e. contents of statement-tokens). Each 
participant in a conversation has her own commitment-store, which acts like a 
constraint on further conversational moves. Thus, a speaker is not licensed to 
produce statements that are inconsistent with one or more of her commitments. 
Once again, we are close to the commitment that speech-act theorists associate 
with assertions. Note in passing that, even though such commitment is to the 
truth of an asserted proposition, it is at the same time a commitment to a future 
course of action (as with promises). That is because showing one’s adherence to 
a proposition has concrete consequences: one may have to provide justifications 
of a claim if challenged, and one is bound to avoid making contradictory claims. 
[Kissine’s contribution provides a detailed discussion of commitment to truth vs. 
commitment to having justifications.] 
Several issues have been addressed by scholars who have adopted the basics 
of Hamblin’s framework. The first is clearly linked to Searle & Vanderveken’s 
logical relation of illocutionary commitment: the question is what exactly a 
speaker who makes an assertion is committed to: only the asserted content? 
different types of implications of that asserted content (presuppositions, 
implicatures)? [Morency, Oswald & Saussure’s contribution considers the issue at 
length; Gunlogson and Izutsu endorse commitment to an implicit content.] Another 
question is whether commitment-stores should include only propositions, or 
other types of commitments. Hamblin himself was aware that modelling of 
certain forms of dialogue would require including ‘imperative’ and ‘emotive’ 
commitments too. Recently, drawing on Ginzburg & Sag’s (2000) ontology of 
contents (see also Leech 1983: 114-118) and following up on a suggestion made 
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by Gazdar (1981), Beyssade & Marandin (2006, forthcoming) have proposed a 
general account of speech acts in dialogue in which commitment can bear on a 
variety of objects. Thus, a directive speech act can be said to commit the speaker 
to an ‘outcome’, a question to a ‘propositional abstract’ and an exclamation to a 
‘fact’. A related question is whether certain speech acts are capable of affecting 
another participant’s commitment-store. Gunlogson (2001) argued that rising 
declarative sentences update the addressee’s commitment-store, not the 
speaker’s. Reluctant to accept the idea of publicly committing another agent, 
Beyssade & Marandin (2006) prefer to speak of a ‘call on addressee’. In their 
framework, every speech act has two main impacts: it updates the speaker’s 
commitment and calls on the addressee to take some action. In her contribution 
to this volume, Gunlogson has modified her previous theory in such a way that a 
speaker uttering a rising declarative sentence now does make a commitment, but 
this commitment is ‘contingent’ upon the addressee’s endorsement of the 
proposition expressed. [See also Poschmann for a lively debate with Gunlogson.] 
The public character of commitment in dynamic models of dialogue is a 
requisite ingredient. Formal semanticists and argumentation theorists are keen to 
insist that a commitment is not a mental state (though there will be relations 
with mental states): 
 
a commitment is not necessarily a belief of the participant who has it. We do 
not believe everything we say; but our saying it commits us whether we believe 
it or not. The purpose of postulating a commitment-store is not psychological. 
(Hamblin 1970: 264) 
 
Similar claims can be found in Gunlogson (2001; she often resorts to the odd 
collocation ‘public beliefs’), or in Beyssade & Marandin (forthcoming). There is 
an obvious parallel with this statement by Lyons: 
 
Anyone who states a certain proposition is committed to it, not in the sense that 
they must in fact know it or believe it to be true, but in the sense that their 
subsequent statements – and anything that can be legitimately inferred from 
their accompanying and subsequent behaviour – must be consistent with the 
belief that it is true. (1995: 254) 
 
The view here is that (a) commitment is not a mental state; it is the expression 
(sincere or not) of a mental state. Yet, perhaps this view requires some 
qualification. The famed argumentation theorist Douglas Walton suggests that, 
at least for the sake of modelling everyday argumentation, commitment-stores 
ought to be divided into “two subsets – a light side of overt, expressed, explicit 
commitments, and a dark side of commitments that are only partially apparent 
or plausibly surmised by one or more of the participants in the dialogue” (1993: 
97; also 1995: 102f). 
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It is clear from this section that dialogue and argumentation theorists make 
extensive use of speech-act-theoretical concepts. This convergence of interests 
did not escape the Levinson of Pragmatics, who argued for a so-called ‘context-
change theory of speech acts’ (1983: 276-277). Recently, however, Green 
(2007) still reflects that there is, curiously, little interaction between speech-act 
theory and dialogue-modelling. Yet both bodies of research largely draw on the 
same notions, and it is apparent from what we have just seen that there are 
marked similarities between the speech-act-theoretic and the formal semantic 
understanding of commitment. 
2. Our own commitment corpus 
In the eleven papers in this volume, more than 83% of occurrences of the 
commit- cognates are tokens of the noun commitment. A little less than 8% are 
occurrences of the structure speaker commits (herself) to. Less than 7,5% are 
occurrences of speaker is committed to. And 1,5% are occurrences of something 
commits speaker to. 
Interestingly, the only authors who use the latter construction (Deschamps, 
Gunlogson, Kissine, Poschmann) are those who are closest to the speech-act-
theoretic approach and/or the dialogue-modelling approach. This is not 
surprising. Use of the construction with an inanimate subject (e.g. assertion, 
declarative sentence, illocutionary force, discourse move) seems to correspond 
with the least psychologising conception of commitment, precisely that which is 
upheld by dialogue and argumentation theorists and – slightly less forcefully – 
by students of speech acts. When the referent of the subject of to commit NP to 
is inanimate, commitment is presented as a ‘contractual’, conventional 
consequence of performing a speech act, something independent of the 
speaker’s actual state of mind. This is especially striking in the few cases where 
the NP stands not for the speaker but for the addressee (cf. Poschmann’s 
treatment of echo-questions in terms of ‘commitment-shift’). In contrast, it 
could be argued that the construction speaker commits (herself) to, which is 
comparatively more frequent, denotes a more psychological understanding, 
because the speaker is represented as deliberately undertaking commitment. 
There is certainly some truth to this, but the contrast must not be overstated. 
The two notions are not necessarily incompatible. For instance, one may have a 
contractual view of illocutionary commitment and a psychological 
understanding of the modal qualification of commitment. But even illocutionary 
commitment alone can be grasped either ‘contractually’ or psychologically. In 
some cases, it is difficult to decide which understanding prevails. Take this 
sentence from Gunlogson’s paper: “In uttering [You got a haircut, with either 
rising or falling intonation], Max commits himself, as a source, to the 
proposition that Laura got a haircut”. We have a speaker who – it can be 
assumed – deliberately commits himself. At the same time the mention of in 
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uttering [that sentence] is conducive to a contractual reading: “the utterance of 
that sentence commits Max …”. 
Some of the verbs or adjectives collocating with the noun commitment may 
also shed light on psychologising vs. non-psychologising conceptions. When 
“weak commitment” is equated with distancing (cf. brief discussion in Cornillie 
& Delbecque), the notion is psychological, unless one assumes that certain 
markers effect distancing, that they distance the speaker from her utterance 
(therefore turning distance into a public rather than a private attitude). In a 
similar vein, Morency, Oswald & Saussure’s idea that 
“attributing/misattributing commitment” is part of the interpretation of the 
speaker’s communicative intentions makes commitment a psychological notion. 
And when commitment is “avoided” or “deferred” (Celle), or “withdrawn” 
(Izutsu), when it is “confident” (Pietrandrea), or when the speaker commits 
herself “in anticipation or in retrospect” (Celle), it is again likely that we are 
dealing with a psychological state. By contrast, when Kissine writes that “by 
performing an assertion, S contracts a public commitment”, we are dealing, 
quite literally, with the contractual notion.  
We have already mentioned that commitment can occur as a count or non-
count noun. This has some bearing on how commitment is viewed. The non-
count noun is used by most contributors. The few who also make extensive use 
of the count noun (Gunlogson, Poschmann – “the proposition is a commitment”) 
are the dialogue theorists with a public, non-psychological concept of 
commitment. Still, the collocation a commitment can also designate the 
speaker’s mental state about a particular proposition (cf. Lansari, Morency, 
Oswald & Saussure), or a particular type of commitment (cf. Kissine, 
Pietrandrea) 
The last point we wish to bring up in this section is the use of the 
construction speaker is committed to. This can be understood as indicating (a) 
commitment resulting from an action of committing oneself (or an event of a 
dialogue move committing a speaker). However, there are cases where the 
expression refers to a prior commitment. Thus, Cornillie & Delbecque talk of 
markers or constructions indicating a commitment or lack of commitment; and 
Izutsu writes that it is “awkward for a speaker who is only weakly committed to 
an assumption to give a command to act according to the assumption”. Such uses 
only make sense if the speaker is already committed before producing her 
utterance. There are also cases where the expression seems to refer both to a 
prior and a resulting commitment. Thus, when Deschamps says of a speaker 
who has performed a directive act that she is committed to a desire, she states 
both a prior, private ‘sincerity condition’ of the act, and its public consequence. 
This shows that there is no fundamental incompatibility between the two 
readings.  
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3. The contributions 
Agnès CELLE describes the modal uses of the future tense and the conditional in 
French in terms, respectively, of speaker commitment and speaker non-
commitment, and contrasts the use of the two markers with that of their English 
counterparts will, allegedly, etc. Commitment is viewed by the author as “part 
and parcel of assertion”: in the normal case the speaker is the source of the 
propositional content of her utterance and commits herself to its truth. When the 
speaker is not so committed, assertion is suspended. 
Bert CORNILLIE & Nicole DELBECQUE propose a description of two Spanish-
language phenomena – deviant que / de que constructions and the modal verbs 
poder, deber and tener que – in terms not of weak vs. strong commitment 
(corresponding to weak vs. strong certainty), as is traditionally done, but of high 
vs. low speaker involvement. The latter concept pertains to the role of the 
speaker as a conceptualizer in the construal of the meaning of a linguistic 
expression. In doing so, they replace the notion of commitment, widely used for 
the description of those markers, by that of involvement. 
In his empirical study of Spanish que-clauses after a cognition verb (e.g. 
creer, pensar, opinar), Bram DE SAEGER explains why the notion of 
involvement proves more useful than that of commitment. Cognition predicates 
being non-factive, the speaker is not committed to the truth of the content of the 
complement clause. The author distinguishes various patterns of involvement as 
a function of two pairs of opposite parameters: speaker vs. subject perspective 
on the content of the clause, and argumentative vs. descriptive use of that 
content. 
Karen DESCHAMPS considers commitment both in terms of a psychological 
state of the speaker (an attitude towards a propositional content) and the 
speaker’s responsibility (his being the source of a content). She uses the notion 
to account for the differences between the normative use and the reportive use 
(or directive + declarative force vs. assertive illocutionary force) of deontic 
sentences in four different types of legal-administrative texts in Dutch. It turns 
out that the two ways of understanding commitment (in terms of psychological 
states vs. responsibility) do not overlap perfectly. 
Christine GUNLOGSON gives a formal semantic and pragmatic account of 
declarative questions in English. She starts from the principle that declaratives 
always express speaker commitment – even when used as questions. Each 
commitment pragmatically requires a source (‘Source Principle’) and being a 
source involves having adequate evidence for a proposition. Furthermore, 
speaker commitment can only be reconciled with questionhood if it is 
contingent. The author shows that the requirements that a source have adequate 
evidence and that commitment be contingent explain the distributional 
restrictions on ‘initiating declarative questions’. 
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Mistuko Narita IZUTSU argues that commitment can throw light on the 
dissimilarities between two Japanese markers of concession, -noni and -kedo. 
Though some contexts allow the use of both connectives (which then translate 
roughly as ‘although’), many contexts disfavour one of the two. The author 
argues that such distributional differences stem from the fact that -noni 
expresses strong commitment and -kedo weak commitment to an implicit 
assumption underlying the concessive meaning. A similar analysis is given for 
the Russian connectives a and no. 
Mikhail KISSINE examines two ways of defining assertion in terms of 
commitment: commitment to the truth of the proposition and commitment to 
having evidence or justifications for the propositional content. He argues that 
the latter commitment – which on Brandom and Williamson’s dominant 
accounts must be understood as commitment to having demonstrative 
justifications – is too strong a condition on assertion. By contrast, commitment 
to the truth of the proposition is shown to apply even in the case of modally 
weakened assertions. 
In her empirical paper, Laure LANSARI describes the contrasts between be 
going to and aller + infinitive as used in if-constructions, in narratives and in 
news texts. She shows that in these contexts the notion of commitment throws 
light on significant differences between the two markers: aller + inf. expresses a 
variety of values, notably ‘ambivalent commitment’, whereas be going to 
usually signals that the origin of commitment is separate from the speaker. 
Patrick MORENCY, Steve OSWALD & Louis de SAUSSURE examine how a 
hearer attributes commitment to a speaker. The authors’ key concern are the 
beliefs a hearer forms about what he infers the speaker has committed to in 
making her utterance. Working within a relevance-theoretic framework, they 
regard strategies of inferring commitment as part of a general process of 
inferring speaker meaning (explicit and implicit). 
Paola PIETRANDREA examines the semantic and distributional differences 
between two Italian markers of strong commitment, certamente and 
sicuramente, and traces them to a difference in terms of commitment. 
Certamente is analysed as a marker that attributes the point of view expressed in 
the sentence to another discursive voice and “marks a commitment to the truth 
of a content that is expressed in agreement or in opposition to other discursive 
voices”. Sicuramente is analysed as a marker of alternative monophonic 
judgments; it marks “the progression of commitment or its restriction to a 
limited domain of application”. 
Claudia POSCHMANN studies declarative questions in terms of commitment. 
She distinguishes between echo-questions and confirmative questions (rising 
ones and falling ones), notably on the basis of their different linguistic 
behaviour. Confirmative questions involve speaker-commitment (dependent or 
not on the addressee’s acknowledgment). Echo-questions do not; they involve a 
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commitment-shift to some other agent in the context (e.g. the one who is 








1 In what follows, we will often use the shortcut the term to refer to commitment and its verbal 
and adjectival cognates. 
2 An example is supplied by the French conditional. This marker, described by some linguists as 
a marker of non-commitment (‘non prise en charge’ in Abouda 2001) or as a ‘mixed 
grammatical marker’ of ‘zero modalisation’ (read ‘non commitment’) plus evidentiality (‘or 
mediation’, in Kronning’s 2005 terminology), can be used in a particular context for information 
“obtained from a questionable secondhand source for whose veracity the speaker refuses to take 
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